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I. Introduction
In the aftermath  of the break-up of the Soviet Union, trade among  the new independent
states collapsed.  Estimates  vary, but the drop in volume  terms may have been as much as 50%
between 1992 and 1995 (see table 1). We have  discussed  the reasons and the consequences  of this
drastic decline  elsewhere  (Michalopoulos  and Tarr, 1994; 1996).
The three Baltic countries  decided, early on, to reorient  their trade to Europe and the rest
of the world; and all three  have signed association  agreements  with the European Union. The
other twelve countries (members  of the Commonwealth  of Independent  States (CIS)), attempted,
mostly  unsuccessfully,  to maintain  trade with each other through  a variety of policy interventions,
including  through  the establishment  of a Free Trade Agreement  (FTA). In 1995 three countries,
Belarus, Kazakstan  and Russia established  a customs  union which  the Kyrgyz Republic  agreed to
join in 1996.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze  the economic  implications  of a customs  union
among  transition economies,  such as the one established  by these four countries, for both existing
and prospective  members. The next section  of the paper describes  in broad terms the current trade
regines of the CIS, including  the arrangements  that govern trade with each other. The third
section analyses  the economic  effects of the customs  union, in part through  the use of a partial
equilibrium  model described  in detail in the appendix.  The focus is on the effects  of joining the
I  The authors are, respectively:  Senior  Advisor in the Russia  and Central Asia Department,  the World Bank;
and Lead Economist,  International  Economics  Department,  The World Bank. Helpful  comments  on an earlier draft
were received from Peter Hansen  and Maurice  Schiff  of the World Bank, Svyatoslav  Perfilov  of the CIS Interstate
Economic  Committee  and international  trade representatives  of the 17  transition  economies  who participated  at the
EDI seminar  on  Trade Policy in Transition  and WTO  Accession, January  31-February  6, 1997,  Vienna,  Austria.
We thank Minerva Patena  and Maria Luisa de la Puente  for logistical  support.  The views  expressed  are those of the
authors and not necessarily  those of the World  Bank or those acknowledged.
Icustoms  union for countries which  have not done so.  As most CIS members  are applying  for
accession  to the WTO, this section  also draws some implications  of the customs  union for WTO
accession. The last section summarizes  the policy  conclusions  and implications  of the analysis.
While the analysis  focuses on the CIS countries, some  of the fmdings  may be of relevance  to other
countries in transition--for  example, among  the countries  of the former Yugoslavia,  that are
considering  the establishment  of similar arrangements.
II. The Trade Regimes
While the trade policy framework  continues  to be evolving  and varies considerably  among
countries, the following  main features  characterize  the trade regimes of CIS members:
On the import side, most countries  have so far avoided  the establishment  of quantitative
restrictions  or licensing. But protectionist  pressures are rising and leading to the imposition  of
such controls in some countries  (e.g., Uzbekistan)  or sectors (alcoholic  beverages--  in Russia).
The tariff regimes vary considerably,  but on the whole  countries  have established  few tariffs
exceeding  30%. Some  countries  have low and uniform tariffs, e.g., Armenia's maximum  tariff is
10% and the Kyrgyz Republic  has a 10% uniform  tariff); while in others the range goes up to
100% for a few items. In Russia, the average  is about 13-14%  with a range from 0 to 30% for
most commodities,  with some selected  items considerably  higher (see table 2 for details at a
somewhat  aggregated  level).
On the export side, there has been significant  dismantling  of export controls in most
countries; but controls of exports through state trading  continues  in some  key exportables  (cotton,
oil and natural gas).
Trade with each other, is in principle free under the terms of the FTA. Imports  are duty
free, but it appears that export and foreign exchange  controls in practice limit trade among  some
of the countries. Weaknesses  in the payments  systems  continue  to hamper trade, leading to
continuing  use of barter; but the previous state to state barter agreements  have been by and large
eliminated.  Many countries have established  a mixed  VAT system: "origin" based for CIS trade
2and "destination"  based with regard to the rest of the world. This means that with respect  to CIS
countries, imports are not taxed but domestic  producers  pay the VAT regardless  of whether the
good is exported or sold domestically.  For the rest of the world, imports  pay the VAT but exports
are zero rated.
The Customs  Union  members  negotiated  a common  external  tariff  based on the Russian
tariff. But in the course of 1996, the three original  members  unilaterally  introduced  modifications
to the external tariffs they applied to some  commodities  (Rietzler  and Usmanova, 1996); also, as
of the time of this writing, the Kyrgyz Republic  had not taken any steps to introduce  the common
external tariff but instead  continued  to apply a uniform 10% tariff to imports  from the rest of the
world. All four countries  are applying  to the WTO on the basis of individual  tariff schedules
rather than as a custom  union.  Thus, at present, strictly speaking,  there is no common  external
tariff for the Customs  Union. But the agreements  are still in place and the governments  may
pursue further steps towards their full implementation.
I-.  The Effects  of  Customs  Union
There are two kinds of effects of customs  unions, static and dynamic. The static effects
relate to the impact  of the establishment  of the customs  union on welfare. The analysis in this
instance  focuses  on a comparison  of the welfare of a country  or groups of countries  before and
after the establishment  of the customs  union; thus the analysis  is one of comparative  statics. The
dynamic  effects focus on the impact  the customs  union on the rate of output growth of a country
or countries in the medium  term 2 Many analysts  have noted (Winters  1996) that supporters  of
customs  unions and other regional  preferential  arrangements  frequently  find that the static welfare
effects are typically  small and possibly  negative. They then focus on the potential  dynamic
benefits, which however, are difficult  to define  and even more difficult  to measure.
2  It is important  to note that output  growth  can not be equated  to welfare  growth,  as some of the mechanisms  that
may result in increasing  the rate  of growth  of output  in a future  period  may involve  reduced  consumption  and welfare in
the present.
3In the case of the CIS countries, there is already a FTA among  all members  as well as a
Customs  Union (CU) among  some  of them however  modified  by specific  exceptions  for variation
from a common  external tariff. Hence the analysis  of both dynamic  and static effects  has  to
compare  the advantages  and disadvantages  of joining this specific  customs  union not just any one,
and assumes  that in principle the alternative  to joining, is continuation  of the FTA among  the CIS;
but the implications  of a different  alternative,  under which countries  that do not join the CU are
excluded from the FTA area, also briefly examined.
Static  Welfare Effects
The principal impact  of joining the customs  union would  be to replace  the external tariff of
each of the countries  with the common  external tariff of the customs  union. In general, under
these circumstances  the benefits of joining the CU would depend  to a considerable  extent on the
height  and structure  of each of the countries  external tariff compared  to that of the Customs  Union
external tariff. While in practice a Customs  Union external  tariff may not be in place at present,
for purposes of analysis, the Russian  tariff is a good proxy of the Customs  Union  external tariff
that had been negotiated  and will be used for the discussion  in this paper. If a country such as
Armenia  or the Kyrgyz Republic  with lower external  tariffs were to substitute  the Russian tariff
for its own tariff structure, it would increase  its unweighted  average  tariff to 13-14 percent (see
table 2). More importantly,  assuming  that following  accession  of new members, the common
external tariff is not changed, the Russian  tariff exhibits  considerably  more dispersion  compared
with the tariff for some  of the countries  (typically  between  0 and 30 percent), 3 meaning  that for
selected  highly protected  products in Russia, the tariff would increase  significantly. For other
countries, adopting  the common  external tariff would mean actually  reducing  their average tariff.
Starting with Jacob Viner (1950), international  trade economists  typically  analyze
preferential  trade arrangements,  whether  members  of a FTA or a CU, in terms of trade creation
3  See table 2 for a listing  of the Russian  tariff  by sector.  Since  an aggregation  was  performed  in table  2, the
Russian  tariff is higher for some tariff lines  within  the aggregates  shown  than  for the  sector  as a whole.
4and trade diversion. Trade creation in a product  occurs, when additional  imports  come from
partner countries  which displace  sales of inefficient  domestic  producers and these imports are at
least as cheap as imports from non-partner  countries.  Trade creation  results in improved  welfare
for the importing  country for much the same reasons as increased  trade improves  a country's
welfare. On the other hand, trade diversion  occurs  when suppliers  in the rest of the world (who
continue  to face tariffs) are more efficient  than partner suppliers, but additional  partner country
imports  displace  the more efficient suppliers. Trade diversion  is typically  (but not necessarily)
welfare reducing since the home country must pay more to import the product from the less
efficient  partner country suppliers.
Although  the general theory of regional  trading  arrangements  is quite ambiguous  in its
conclusions,  we believe  some definitive  conclusions  are possible  with respect to the  specific
customs  union under consideration,  at least for some  of the CIS countries. Since the partner
countries  in the potential  customs  union already have tariff free access to the other CIS markets
under the Free Trade Agreement,  prices in these countries' markets  cannot fall as a result of the
customs  union, i.e., there will be little welfare gain from trade creation. Whatever  trade creation
would occur, would  come from third country  suppliers  in those  products where the current
external tariff in the country is higher than that of the Customs  Union external  tariff.  Since
welfare  costs from a tariff  increase  with the square of the tariff rate, net welfare effects are little
impacted  by reductions  in tariffs by a few percentage  points say,  from ten to seven  percent.
Rather what is crucial  to the welfare effects  are the changes  that involve significant  tariff
increases.4
Countries  with Lower Tariffs Than in the Customs  Union.  Prospective  partner country
suppliers will have the potential, under the higher tariffs of the customs  union, to raise prices to
consumers  in other CIS countries  by the amount  of the tariff preference  over rest of world
imports. In the model we present in the appendix,  we assume that they will do so. A principal
reason we believe they will do so is our judgment  that advocates  of the customs  union propose it
4  See Morkre and Tarr (1980, chapter 2) for details.
5as a means of expanding  protection  for inefficient  domestic  industries  throughout  the CIS. That is,
the customs  union is an import substitution  strategy for inefficient  industries,  where the structure
of the tariff is high in those industries  that exist in the customs  union, especially in Russia. In the
appendix,  we elaborate  some additional reasons  why we believe  they will do so.  Thus, a key
assumption  of our model is that prospective  members  of the customs  union face upward sloping
supply  curves from partner country  suppliers  who will raise prices  by the extent of the tariff.
Moreover, since these countries  have tariff free access to markets of the members of the
customs  union and to Russia in particular, the exporters  from a CIS country  joining the CU will
not obtain improved  access to the Russian market, which  is by far the dominant  market in the
customs  union.  Thus, for countries  like the Kyrgyz Republic  and  Armenia  with already liberal
external tariffs or others like Georgia  and Moldova  which are also pursuing  generally  liberal trade
policies  and assuming  the common  external  tariff is not changed following  their accession,  the
usual tradeoffs that must be considered  in the evaluation  of a preferential  trade arrangement  (trade
diversion  versus improved  access and trade creation) do not apply.  Thus, the CU would virtually
result in pure trade diversion  (see the appendix  for details).
High tariff protection  for such small economies  is generally  very inefficient  and costly.
Protection  prevents the transmission  of world prices to the economy  and thereby prevents market
signals from inducing  resource reallocation  to areas of comparative  advantage  in the economy.
Experience  has shown  that over time, countries  with high protection  generally  grow more slowly
than those with low protection  (see, e.g.,  Thomas, Nash and others, 1991; and Sachs and
Warner, 1995).  Moreover,  we show in the appendix  that increasing  an external tariff within the
framework of a customs  union with Russia  and the other partners for a small CIS country, is much
more costly than simply  raising tariffs, without  preferential  treatment  to the customs  union
members. In fact, in this example  the customs  union will be several times more inefficient  and
costly to the small country  than simply  raising  tariffs to the rest of the world in a non-preferential
manner.
6Joining the customs  union with a common  external  tariff such as that previously  negotiated
is so costly for several reasons: First, partner country suppliers  can raise prices under the tariff
protection  they receive from preferential  protection. Then for the quantities  previously  purchased
from partner country suppliers, consumers  in member  countries  with a previously lower external
tariff will likely pay higher prices (excluding  the tariffs) to partner country  producers than they
were paying prior to participation  in the customs  union, i.e., there is an adverse  terms-of-trade
effect on the initial quantities  purchased  from partner country suppliers. Second, since rest of
world imports are subject to a higher tariff, there will be a diversion  of sales away from rest of
the world suppliers  toward partner country suppliers.  This  trade diversion entails two costs: (a)
since the importing country  does not collect  any tariff revenue on imports  from partner countries,
there is a loss of the tariff revenue  on these trade diverting  imports; 5 and (b) excluding  the tariff,
consumers  will have to pay higher prices to partner country  suppliers  than they were paying  to
rest of world suppliers  prior to participation  in the customs  union.
In their comprehensive  theoretical  treatment,  Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996) describe a
model in which partner country suppliers  have perfectly  elastic supply  curves. This situation  might
be expected to apply if a country is forming a preferential  trade area with a very large market,
such as the European Union or NAFTA, because  competition  among  many suppliers  in the large
market results in flat supply  curves to the prospective  new member  country. In this case, there is a
much larger likelihood  of the preferential  trade area being welfare increasing  since the new
member will not suffer a terms-of-trade  loss on its purchases  from the suppliers from the large
market.
Countries  with Higher Average Tariffs  Than in the Customs  Union. For countries  with a
higher average  external tariff than that of the CU, the results are more ambiguous. On the one
hand, in converting  to the common  external  tariff, since the average  tariff is lower than in the
5  The loss of tariff revenue  due to the diversion  of imports  away from the rest of the world is a loss of welfare
to the home country, since it will have  raise tax revenue  from other sources  to offset  the loss of government  revenue.
This is in contrast  to a reduction  of tariffs multilaterally,  where  consumers  benefit  from a reduction  in the price they
pay, and the increase in consumers'  surplus  offsets the loss of tariff revenue.
7home country, there will be a number of products  where the external tariff will be reduced. Then
there will be a welfare gain on those  products where the external  tariff is lowered  because there
will be some trade creation from additional  imports  from rest of the world suppliers  (partner
country suppliers  already have tariff free access due to the FTA so no additional  trade creation is
possible from CIS partners). On the other hand, the negotiated  tariff of the CU is not uniforn;
rather it favors  production of those  products  already produced  in the CU.  Even in countries with
higher average tariffs than in the CU, their tariffs typically  favor their home production.
Substitution  of the CU tariff will shift the tariff structure  so that it favors the producers of the CU,
i.e., tariffs will be high on the products  produced  in the CU and low on the products produced  in
the home country, and it is likely  that even in countries  with higher average  tariffs, they will have
to raise their external tariffs on many products  produced  in their partner countries.  This will
allow partner country producers to charge higher prices under the protection  of higher tariffs on
third country producers, a significant  welfare  loss that is likely  to dominate. A choice available  to
a country in these circumstances  is to lower its tariff on third countries, without  joining the CU.
This option offers the gains from the trade creation on the products  where the external tariff is
being lowered, without the losses of  the trade diversion  from having  to pay higher prices to
inefficient  partner country suppliers.
Russia, Kazakstan  and Belarus. Finally, briefly consider  the welfare impact  on Russia,
Kazakstan  and Belarus, the members  of the Customs  Union  which had adopted  the common
external tariff.  Since the tariff structure  favors production  in these countries, then as more
countries  join the Customs  Union, in the short run producers in these countries  will gain
additional  profits and exports from the additional  protection  they receive against  rest of world
imports  in the new partner country  markets. Since  the costs of protecting  home producers will be
borne in part by consumers  in partner countries,  the strategy has an initial appeal in the countries
whose producers receive  the high protection. But, because  the benefits of a liberal trade regime to
consumers  are dispersed widely  (presenting  a free-rider  problem where it is not typically  worth it
to individual  consumers  to lobby their governments  for liberal trade actions)  while the benefits of
8trade protection are concentrated  in the industry  receiving  protection  (which  provides an incentive
for the industry to lobby its government  for protection),  the kinds of preferential  trade areas that
will typically  arise are those which are trade diverting  (see Grossman  and Helpman  (1995)).
Thus, in order for the existing  members  of the Customs  Union  to convince  additional  members to
join, or at least to remain members  over time,  it is likely that the tariff structure  will have to
change in a way that offers protection  to producers  of other CIS countries, i.e., the existing
members  will have to offer protection  in their markets to high priced products  produced  in non-
member  CIS states.  A country  will not participate  in a Customs  Union if the Customs  Union
offers neither enhanced  protection  for its producers  nor widespread  benefits for its consumers.  6
If the external tariff is adjusted  to accommodate  the inefficient  producers of new members,
although  some of the producers of the existing member  countries  may still gain from a wider
Customs  Union, the benefits to the countries  as a whole are going to be reduced and countries
could become  net losers.  That is, the short-run  gains to existing  producers mask potential  longer
term costs of not opening  up trade to the rest of the world. It is likely  that the entire CIS is not
collectively  large enough to approximate  world market efficiency  in most products.  Thus, a
strategy of widening  the protection  of domestic  producers  through  a Customs  Union of a set of the
CIS countries, is really an import substitution  policy  through  protection  on a slightly larger scale,
a strategy that has retarded  growth in many countries  (see, e.g.,  Bhagwati  and Krueger, 1973;
Sachs and Warner, 1995; and Thomas, Nash and others, 1991).7
6  We have already observed the manifestation of these problems, as Kazakstan and Belarus have selectively
suspended application of the common external tariff, i.e,  the trade diversion costs were evident to the parties (see
Rietzler and Usmanova, 1996, p. 30)
7  If the common external tariff is renegotiated to reflect the interests of the non-member countries,  then the
static welfare economics for non-member countries will not be as adverse as depicted in the sections above treating the
welfare economics of the non-member countries. Nonetheless,  liberalization toward the world as a whole would
remain the preferred strategy to joining the Customs Union, since , as just discussed, even the CIS as a whole must be
wary of an import-substitution strategy.
9Revenue  Effects
Due to the potential  impact  on the fiscal deficit, macro  stabilization  and inflation,
governments  must also be cognizant  of the impact  of preferential  trade arrangements  on their
revenues.  In this section, we examine  various aspects  of this question for the CIS countries.
Tariffs.  Joining the customs  union is likely  to have negative  revenue implications  on
individual  new members. As there will continue  to be no tariffs on trade within the customs
union, to the extent that rest of world imports are displaced,  tariff revenue will be lost to the
customs  union.  In addition, despite  the fact that the customs  union agreements  stipulate that the
tariff revenue will go to the country  to whom the imports  are destined, one can not overlook the
potential  administrative  problems  associated  with obtaining  tariff revenues from the customs
offices  of other member countries, especially  given the weakness  in tax reserve collections in all
these countries. And there are other reasons  to believe  that revenues of imports  from the rest of
the world will be diminished. There are central  administrative  institutions  of a customs  union that
will have to receive funding. Funding for the administration  of the customs  union or any
centralized  programs is typically  done out of tariff revenue collected  by the customs  union.
Excise Taxes. Accession  to the customs  union will increase  pressure on members  to
harmonize  excise tax rates.  These rates are presently  rather diverse both within the CU countries
and potential  members. The tax revenue implications  of unified rates would  have to be assessed
in each case individually.
Value Added Taxes. The dominant  practice among  the CIS countries  is to apply the value
added tax (VAT)  on a mixed  basis. That is, for trade outside  of the CIS, imports are taxed but
exports are not, the "destination"  system.  For trade within the CIS, exports are taxed but imports
are not, the "origin system." Participation  in the customs  union will require a value added tax that
is harmonized  with the system applicable  in the customs  union, i.e., the current mixed system.
Berglas (1981)  has shown that under certain  assumptions  (including  flexible  exchange  rates) the
origin or destination  systems  are equivalent  and do not tax the trade regime if designed  properly.
Since the VAT rates of most CIS are approximately  equalized,  the allocation  of real resources
10and trade flows among  the other CIS countries  is not seriously  affected, but it is important  to
harmonize  these taxes within a mixed system  to avoid arbitrage and distortions. 8
What is more likely  to be a problem with a mixed  VAT system is the allocation  of tax
revenues. Even if the VAT rates are harmonized,  countries  with a trade deficit within the customs
union and a trade surplus outside  the customs  union will experience  an adverse  transfer of VAT
tax revenues toward the partners in the customs  union with the opposite  trade pattern. To
illustrate, suppose  the trade of Azerbaijan  is balanced  overall, but it imports exclusively  from, say
Russia, and exports exclusively  outside  the customs  union, and that Russia  has the opposite trade
balance.
Since the destination  system applies  on  trade outside  of the CIS, and the origin principle
applies on trade within the CIS, Azerbaijan  would collect  no VAT tax revenues (neither  on its
imports nor its exports), and Russia would  collect all the VAT revenue on trade (Russia  collects
VAT on both its exports to Azerbaijan  and its imports  from the rest of the world). Thus, even
though the mixed VAT system would  not change  relative  prices and is therefore non-distortionary
because there is no impact  on the allocation  of resources, in this example  it would represent a
transfer of VAT revenues from Azerbaijan  to Russia.
Dynamic  Effects
In general, there are two basic ways in which  the rate of output growth can increase: First
through a faster growth of factor inputs and second  through increases  in the growth of total factor
productivity.  Assuming  no changes  in population  growth  and in labor force participation  rates, the
growth of factor inputs essentially  boils down to  the rate of investment  in human  and physical
capital. Total factor productivity  on the other hand is thought  to be dependent  in the medium  alnd
long term on improvements  in technology  and knowhow.  More generally, access to a diverse mix
of products including  modern  technology  appears  to be very important  for the growth process (see
8  The apparent  (rather than real) incentives  of the mixed  system  may present  difficulties  politically  since  it appears
to provide an incentive to import from the CIS (thus avoiding  VAT on imports) and export to non-CIS countries
(where  no VAT is paid).
11e.g., Romer, 1994). New and diverse  technologies  are constantly  appearing and these new
technologies  allow an increase  in the productivity  of both capital and labor. 9
The question that needs  to be addressed  then is how a customs  union among the CIS
countries  will affect output growth through  its impact  on access to technology  that enhances
productivity  and through its effects on the rate of investment  in human and physical capital (see de
Melo, Panagariya  and Rodrik, 1993). There is some  evidence  that developing  countries  total
factor productivity is positively  related to the access of technology  and knowledge  embodied  in
imports  from developed  countries  (Coe and Helpman, 1995;  Coe, Helpman  and Hoffmaister,
1995).  In the case of CIS and other transition  economies,  access  to diverse and modem
intermediate  products from world markets appears  especially  crucial  as these economies  attempt to
transform  themselves  from an industrial structure  that was inherited from the era of the former
Soviet Union, i.e., that was outdated  and frequently  not based on comparative  advantage. It is
very important  that these countries  move away from reliance  on technologies  that are available
only in the countries  that were part of the former Soviet  Union, since the most dynamic  and
modem technologies  are found elsewhere. Yet, tariff protection  for products that are produced in
the customs  union will discourage  the introduction  of new products  and technologies  from outside
the customs  union and free trade area, technologies  that would  boost the growth and development
of the CIS members. Thus, on the question  of enhancing  growth  through improvements  in total
factor productivity  the effect of the customs  union (and for that matter of the exisitng free trade
area) on all its members  is likely to be very negative.
There are several ways through which  a customs  union could affect  the rate of investment
in member  countries: (a) through a change in tariffs and hence in the cost of imported  capital
equipment  that changes  the rate of return on investment  and the rate of capital accumulation;  (b)
through affecting  the financial  system and the overall stability and effectiveness  of economic
policies  that improve the climate of investment; (c) by providing  an incentive  to foreign direct
9  See Rutherford  and Tarr  (1996)  for a model  quantifying  this  effect.
12investmnent  to locate and produce in the countries  of the Union as opposed to exporting  goods and
services( Winters 1996).
Unfortunately,  it is difficult  to make a credible  case that these effects  would be positive in
the case of a customs  union in the CIS. First, it is likely  that the cost of imported  capital would
actually increase especially  for some of the smaller  members, as they could obtain  capital goods
more cheaply  from third countries. Second,  while there are plans for greater integration  of the
financial  systems and economic  policies  of members  which  may have a positive impact  on the
climate of investment  in the future, there is very little chance that any of this will happen in the
immediate  future. In fact, premature  integration  without  adequate  multilateral  institutions  may
resurrect some of the problems  of the recent past which contributed  to instability.  For example,
the common  ruble area of 1992-1993,  without monetary  coordination  of the multiple central banks
was a root cause of inflation  and the problems  of trade (see Michalopoulos  and Tarr, 1992; 1993).
The key challenge  in all countries  is how to improve  the national  environment  for private sector
development through  the establishment  of policies  and institutions  ( for example  better
enforcement  of contractual  obligations)  that improve  the investment  climate--policies  that may best
be pursued unilaterally in the near term. Third, it is possible  that as result of the establishment  of
the customs  union, there may be a positive  effect on foreign investment  that comes in to "jump"
the common  external  tariff. How big this effect will be is hard to predict simply  because  there are
so many other factors that constrain  the inflow of foreign  direct investment  which countries need
to address first and which are likely  to have a far greater impact  on  foreign direct investment  than
the stimulus  provided by the establishment  of a customs  union. More importantly,  foreign  direct
investment  which is in response  to tariff jumping can cause the welfare and growth rate of the
capital importing  country to decline  (see Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro,  1977).  The reason is tht
foreign investment  responds to the private return to capital, and the foreigners will repatriate
profits based on their private returns; but when the sector is highly protected,  the social return to
investment  in the sector is much lower than the private return.
13In sum, while the dynamic  effects  of establishing  or joining a customs  union and of the
exisiting  Free Trade Area in the CIS are difficult  to demonstrate,  they are likely to be negative,
especially  because of the adverse effect  of  the preferential  arrangements  on technology  and
productivity  improvements.
The Threat of the Loss of the Free Trade Agreement
In the event that a CIS country fails to join the customs  union, there is some possibility
that the members of the customs  union would apply the common  external  tariff to the exports of
that CIS country; that is, they may revoke  their Free Trade Agreements. Although  we must be
cautious since the effects  will vary from country to country  and we do not have precise estimates,
the net welfare impact of participation  in the Free Trade Agreement  is likely  to be negative for
most CIS countries; consequently,  the threat of exposure  to the common  external tariff of the
customs  union is not an event that should  be feared  for most CIS countries.
The reasons are as follows: If Russia, Kazakstan  and Belarus, withdraw  from the Free
Trade Agreements  and apply the negotiated  common  external  tariff of the customs  union to
exports from the other CIS countries, there would  be economic  impacts  on both the imports and
the exports of these CIS countries. Regarding  imports, as explained  in detail in the appendix,
applying  tariffs on imports  from former partner countries  in the CIS results in displacement  of
partner country imports  by rest of world supply. This results in a gain in tariff revenue on these
sales. Moreover, since partner country suppliers  are likely, in many products, to lower their
prices to the extent of reduction  of the tariff on rest of world products (since marginally  inefficient
partner country suppliers  will be forced out of the market as competition  from rest of world
producers becomes  more intense), CIS consumers  will be able to pay less to partner suppliers  by
the amount of the tariff, and this is a gain to their economic  welfare. Moreover, permitting
efficient imports  from the rest of the world as opposed to preserving inefficient  imports from
partners in the former Soviet Union, is very productive  in terms of breaking  away from the
outdated  and inefficient  technology  of the Soviet  past.
14Weighed  against this potential  gain in welfare  from application  of tariffs on imports in the
CIS is the loss in welfare from lost preferential  access to the markets of countries in the Customs
Union. Exporters from the CIS countries  outside  the Customs  Union would  no longer be able to
obtain  higher prices than producers from the rest of the world on exports to the countries  in the
Customs  Union, since like exporters  from the rest of the world, their exports would also be
subject to the tariff.  But since the negotiated  tariff of the Customs  Union is based on the Russian
external tariff, it tends to be high in those items important  to Russian  producers. That is, products
important  to the exports of the CIS tend to be inputs into production  in Russia  and therefore have
relatively low tariffs in the Customs  Union.  Although  we must again be cautious since this effect
will vary from country to country and we do not have precise estimates,  this implies  that most CIS
countries outside  Russia, Belarus  and Kazakstan  likely derive little terms of trade gain on their
exports to the Customs  Union, from the fact that they are in the Free Trade Agreement. That is,
most CIS countries perhaps  with the exception  of Ukraine, would  likely be able to sell the vast
majority on their products in the same markets with small losses losses that are considerably
smaller than the losses suffered  by their consumers  from having  to pay higher prices to the
exporters from the Customs  Union. Moreover, the dynamic  effects  of the free trade area could
also be negative, for all its members.
It would be desirable for CIS exporters  to find alternate  marketing  channels  outside  of the
CIS Customs  Union countries. This would reduce dependence  on a limited  number of countries
for markets and transportation  facilities. Absent Free Trade Agreements,  it will become  even
more imperative  for exporters  from the CIS to find alternate  markets and marketing  channels.
Moreover, while finding new markets outside  of the Customs  Union countries  may require a
difficult adjustment  period, the experience  of the Baltic countries  between 1992 and 1994
demonstrates  that rapid adjustment  is possible. 10
10  In earlier papers (Michalopoulos  and Tarr, 1992; 1993)  we argued  in favor of temporary  Free Trade
Agreements  among  the newly independent  states. The argument  was based  on easing transition  costs due to the heavy
interlinkages  of the production  structures  in the countries  of the FSU. The  justification  for the continuation  of the Free
Trade Agreements  on the basis of easing  the adjustment  costs, however,  becomes  progressively  weaker over time and
the importance  of integrating  with the rest of the world  becomes  more important  over time. These concerns were
15Accession  to the World Trade Organization
Most CIS members  have begun the process of accession  to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The WTO permits custom  unions as long as they meet two basic requirements: (a) they
cover substantially  all trade among  the partners; and (b) do not result in an increase in the level of
protection  to the outside  world relative to before the establishment  of the CU.  In the past these
WTO provisions  have been applied  quite flexibly  and it is quite possible  that the CU negotiated
among  the four CIS members  would  meet the WTO standards. Thus participation  in this customs
union will not by itself prevent an individual  country from joining the WTO.  The question is
whether it would be useful for individual  countries  to enter the CU and join the WTO as part of
the CU or individually. Judging from recent experience,  it will complicate  the accession  process
to the WTO of individual  CIS members  to present  an accurate picture of its trade regime to the
members  of the WTO "working  party" who will be charged  with the negotiation  of their accession
if they were to move to make commitments  in joining the CU before they become  members of the
WTO. That is, the WTO working party would  perceive that the present trade regime of the CIS
country will be changed significantly  in the future if it joins the Customs  Union. Perhaps it is for
this reason that Belarus, Kazakstan,  the Kyrgyz Republic  and Russia are applying  to accede  to the
WTO on an individual  basis, not as members  of a CU.
IV. Conclusions  and Recommendations
1. For small CIS countries, with relatively  open trade regimes,  joining the Customs  Union
that has been established  by several CIS members  could be economically  quite costly.
These costs could be mitigated,  but probably  not fully offset, if as a consequence  of the entry of
new members, both the average  level and the dispersion  of the previously  negotiated  external tariff
of the customs  union were reduced. For these countries, maintaining  an open trade regime without
reflected  in our weakened  endorsement  of the  Free Trade  Agreements  in Michalopoulos  and Tarr (1994),  and our
considerable  reservations  toward  them in Michalopoulos  and Tarr  (1996).
16preferences  is the best policy  that maximizes  welfare  and growth  prospects. It will also facilitate
entry into the WTO, a key objective  for these countries' trade policies.
2.  Even for the existing customs  union members, and for others with more restrictive
trade regimes than those of existing members,  preferential  arrangements  that provide strong
incentives  to orient trade towards partners in the former Soviet  Union contain significant  long
term risks. The main risks are that the preferences  (through  customs  union or free trade
arrangements)  lock in traditional  technologies  and production  structures, reduce innovation  and
competition,  and hence result in inefficient  industries  that absorb scarce resources  that could be
better used elsewhere.
3. The discussion  has focused  on preferences  and a specific  customs  union arrangement
among CIS  countries. But it has relevance  for preferential  arrangements,  including  customs
unions, that might be considered  in the context of other country  groupings  in the CIS as well as in
transition economies  in Eastern Europe, e.g. former  Yugoslavia.  In this case as well, the main
problems  would arise from lack of competition  and the absence  of dynamic  technology. The
discussion  is not intended  to apply to countries  in transition  joining the EU, where different
circumstances  prevail which improve the prospects  for economic  benefits.
4. The key difference  between preferential  arrangements  among  CIS members  and other
preferential  arrangements  (NAFTA, the EU) is that in the latter the markets are large enough to
promote competition  and encourage  the flow of new technology  which increase  the probability  that
distortions  introduced  through  preferences  are more than offset  by new trade creation and
the dynamic  effects of investment  embodying  new technology.
5. We had advocated  preferential  arrangements  for CIS members  as useful transitional
devices to mitigate  the severe disruption  of trade among  the new independent  states in the
aftermath  of the breakup of the Soviet Union (Michalopoulos  and Tarr, 1992; 1994).  Although
based on duration of unemployment  measures, two years appears  to be a sufficient  period of
adjustment  in market economies,"'  there is no standard  period for adjustment  or transition; and the
See S. Matusz (1997)  for a survey.
17breakup of the Soviet  Union clearly created  unprecedented  disruption  which may have warranted  a
greater adjustment  period. The new independent  states  have had five years to adjust to
international  competition.  Given  the inherited  burden of inefficiencies  that plagues  a sizable
portion of CIS industry, there are serious  costs of continuing  preferential  arrangements
indefinitely,  and integrating  more closely through  a customs  union at this time appears ill-advised.
18Appendix
Model  to Evaluate  the Consequences  of Joining  the Customs  Union
In this appendix,  we develop  a simple  partial equilibrium  model to assess  the
consequences  of adopting  the common  external tariff, where the common  external tariff is higher
than the initial tariff. The model would  apply rather broadly  to countries  with low tariffs, such as
the Kyrgyz Republic and Armenia. The model would  also be relevant for many products in
countries with higher tariffs on average  than the Customs  Union tariff. Since  the Customs  Union
tariff is not uniform, there are many products where  the tariff in the Customs  Union exceeds the
home country tariff. The model is an extension  of the model of Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996)
and is shown in figure 1. A basic description  of these techniques  may be found in Morkre and
Tarr (1980).
Demand. We refer to the home country  as country  A. The figure shows the demand for
imports  in country A for a representative  product group, assuming  for simplicity  that imports
from various sources are homogeneous.  Demand  for the domestic  good (assuming  there is
domestic  production)  would  be depicted  on a separate  diagram  but (assuming  otherwise
undistorted  domestic  markets)  we may calculate  welfare  effects from the demand  for imports
diagram.
Rest of World Supply. The rest of the world, denoted  R,  (outside  the customs  union) is
assumed  to be large in relation  to country A considering  membership  and hence the supply  curve
from the rest of the world for any product is depicted  as a perfectly elastic flat supply  curve at the
world price of the product PR. In the initial equilibrium,  the supply  curve from the rest of the
world is represented  by PR( 1 +t), reflecting  the fact that since rest of world suppliers  must receive
PR to be induced to supply the product, consumers  in country  A must pay PR to foreign suppliers
plus t*PR to the government  in tariffs. Converting  to a higher tariff of the customs  union
(weighted  average  of 13-14 percent)  implies that the supply  curve of the rest of the world
increases  to PR(1  +t').
19Partner Country Supply. The group of countries  who are in the Customs  Union are
denoted  country P, for potential  partner countries. For this representative  product, the aggregate
supply curve to country  A from all countries  that are potential  partners with A in the Customs
Union (such as Russia and Kazakstan)  is depicted as S(P). Imports from these countries  are not
subject to a tariff. If tariffs were imposed  on imports  from these countries, it would  be necessary
to pay a tariff inclusive  price to attract the supply. That is, the appropriate  supply curve would be
a function  of the tariff inclusive  price. Then the tariff supply  curve to country A including  the
tariff would shift up and to the left. In figure 1, we write this as S[P/(1  +t)].
In figure 1, we have depicted  partner country supply  as upward sloping. One reason why
this could occur is that partner suppliers  have a factor of production  in limited supply  that implies
that it produces at increasing  costs within the range of outputs  under consideration.  This might be
because of continuing  bottlenecks  for selected  inputs. Even though the market in country A may
be small, the partner country who has firms producing  the product will have to allocate  supply
throughout  all the preferential trade area, and may more experience  capacity  constraints when
supply  to the whole region is taken into account. Another  reason we could have an upward sloping
supply  curve is that the tariff protection  of the Free Trade Area induces  new firms and industries
within the Free Trade Area to develop  under the preferential  tariff protection. These industries
may not have been profitable  without the preferential  protection.  We have drawn the supply curve
such that within the range of tariff changes  contemplated,  there is not a full displacement  of rest of
world supply. In the case of upward sloping  supply curve of the partner country, without  full
displacement  of rest of world supply, the price in country  A will increase  by the full amount of
the tariff.  12
In the event that partner country supply  is not upward sloping for some  products (that is,
partner country supply is flat due to constant costs within the range of relevant outputs)  the
12  Effective  cartel pricing among  producers  within the customs  union  would  also imply  that they will raise prices
in response  to the increase in the tariff, but in that case we could not depict a supply curve and the price increase
would not necessarily  equal the increase in the tariff. Partner producers  could price as a dominant  cartel subject to a
competitive  fringe, where rest of world  supply is the competitive  fringe.
20welfare economics  of participating  in customs  unions  and free trade agreements  will be less
disadvantageous. 13 It is likely that for some  products  imported  within the potential  customs  union,
there are constant costs for partner country  suppliers, and for others products  there are increasing
costs as depicted  in figure 1. Thus, the welfare costs of participating  in the customs  union are
likely to be somewhat  less than would be indicated  from reliance solely on the analysis of figure
1.
Initial Equilibrium:  A Non-Preferential  Ad-Valorem  Tariff
We begin with the situation  that prevailed  prior to the Free Trade Agreement:  a tariff rate
at rate t is applied on all imports. That is, there are no Free Trade Agreements  with any countries,
i.e., no tariff preferences  for customs  union members  or others. In the initial equilibrium,  the
external tariff is t, the price of imports  from the rest of the world to consumers  in country  A is
PR( 1 +t). Thus, the quantity  demanded  of imports  is Mo. Country  A consumers  must pay the
same tariff inclusive  price to future partner country  suppliers, so the price paid for their products
may be read off their tariff ridden supply curve Sp/(1  +t),  i.e., QO. Rest of world suppliers
supply the quantity  Mo - QO.  Tariff revenue is obtained  on all imports, so initial tariff revenue
equals the area MIAD. The tariff revenue is decomposed  into SRAD obtained  on imports from
rest of world suppliers and SRIM  on imports  from future  partner country suppliers.
The short-run static welfare  losses of the tariff are equal to the triangle ADL. Consumers
in country A must pay the higher price PR( 1 +t), rather than PR, and thus there is a loss of
consumers' surplus  equal to the trapezoid  MIAL. But, since the government  recovers the area
MIAD in tariff revenue,  this area is not a loss to the economy.  On the other hand, he area ADL is
a loss to the economy:  it represents  consumption  inefficiency  loss as consumers  in country A shift
purchases  from imports of this good to goods that they preferred less before the tariff.
13  The original analysis  of Viner (1950) considered  constant  costs for partner countries. Both trade creation and
trade diversion  are possible  in the constant  cost case. See Bhagwati  and Panagariya  (1996) for a general treatment of
the various cases.
21The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement
Now consider the impact  of participating  in a Free Trade Agreement,  given a tariff rate of
t on imports from the rest of the world.  Since  the external tariff is unchanged  at rate t, the price
of imports  from the rest of the world to consumers  into country A remains  unchanged at PR( 1 +t).
Thus, the quantity  demanded  of imports  remains MO.  Since imports  from partner countries  are not
subject  to the tariff, supply  from partner countries  shifts out and to the right to the supply curve
Sp. Consumers  in country A must pay the same price to partner countries  suppliers, so the price
paid for their products may be read off their supply  curve Sp, i.e., QO*. Rest of world suppliers
supply  the quantity Mo - QO*.  The government  obtains  tariff revenue on the imports from the rest
of the world, equal to the rectangle  GHAD, but imports  from partner countries enter without
paying tariffs.
What is the welfare economics  of the Free Trade Agreement,  compared  to the initial
equilibrium  with non-preferential  tariffs at rate t on all imports?  A tariff at the rate t still induces a
loss of consumer surplus  equal to the trapezoid  MIAL, but again not all of this is a loss to the
economy. The area ADL remains as a loss to the economy,  representing  consumption  inefficiency
loss. The area of tariff revenue GHAD, however, is recaptured  by the government,  so does not
represent  a loss to the economy.  On the other hand, the shaded  area MIHG is a loss to country A
due to the Free Trade Agreement.  This area is a loss to country A because  it is paying higher
prices to partner suppliers  on the quantity  QO  compared  to what country A would have to pay
from rest of the world suppliers. Part of this higher payment  for partner country imports (the
trapezoid  MNHI) is captured  by partner country suppliers  as producers' surplus. But part of the
higher prices paid by country A consumers  is pure inefficiency  loss, i.e., producers' deadweight
loss equal to NGH, because  the preferential  tariff induces  additional  supply from partner country
suppliers  who are marginally  inefficient  compared  to world suppliers. The net change in welfare
to the government  of the Free Trade Agreement,  given no change in tariffs to the rest of the
world, is a loss equal to the rectangle  MIHG. The combined  loss of the tariff and the Free Trade
Agreement  is the sum of the areas ADL and MIHG.
22In summary, a tariff will induce inefficiency  losses, but the Free Trade Area with partners
with upsloping supply curves greatly magnifies  the losses. With a non-preferential  tariff of t, the
economy  loses only the triangle of consumption  inefficiency  loss, ADL. The Free Trade Area
increases  the losses due to the tariff in the amount of MIHG. This explains  why preferential trade
arrangements  with small partner countries  or with countries  that may be expected  to increase
supply  at higher protected  prices can be expected  to be very inefficient,  more inefficient  than non-
preferential  tariff protection.
Weighed against these costs are the benefits  obtained  from increased  access to partner
country markets. There will likely be a terms of trade gain on these exports, since exports have
preferential  tariff protection  against  rest of world supply. Producers' surplus to the exporters  from
country A within the Free Trade Area (not depicted)  would reduce  the losses from the Free Trade
Area. We have argued above, however, that the gain on exports is likely  to be less than the losses
on imports.
Converting  the Free Trade Area to a Customs  Union
Now consider the impact  of imposing  the common  external  tariff at the rate t', starting
from the Free Trade Agreement  in place. The supply  curve including  the tariff of the rest of the
world and the new equilibrium  price increases  to PR( 1 +t'),  where  the quantity  demanded  for
imports declines  to M1. Partner country  suppliers  also receive  this higher price and then the
quantity  they supply increases  to Q1. The quantity  supplied  from the rest of the world declines  to
M1 - Q1
The welfare costs to country A are strongly  negative, and may be decomposed  into three
parts. First, there are consumer  deadweight  losses because  country A consumers  are induced  to
reduce their consumption  of total imports  from MO  to M 1 in favor of alternate  goods available  that
were previously less preferred (this could include domestic  substitutes  in this product category or
goods in other product categories). These were equal to the triangle ADL in the initial
equilibrium,  but they increase  to BCL. The difference  is the shaded area ABCD, representing  the
23increase  in consumers' deadweight  loss due to the common  external tariff. Second,  there is an
increase  in the triangle of producers' deadweight  losses, from NGH to NFE. The difference  is the
shaded  area FEHG, representing  the increase in producers' deadweight  loss due to the imposition
of the common  external tariff. Partner country producers  are able to obtain higher prices in
country A, which attracts  less efficient  higher cost supply. Absent  a tariff, supplies  from the rest
of the world would have been available  at the price PR.  Third, part of the higher prices received
by partner country suppliers  results in an increase  in their profits or producers' surplus. The
increase  in partner country profits or producers surplus  is HIJE; this is a transfer from country A
consumers  to producers in partner countries.
Overall the loss of moving  to the customs  union, given that a Free Trade Agreement  is
already in place, is the sum of the three shaded areas in figure 1:  ABCD + FEHG + HIJE. The
losses to the economy  of increasing  tariffs through  the common  external  tariff of the customs
union, given a Free Trade Agreement,  are considerably  greater than non-preferential  tariff
increases  from an average  rate of t to t'. That is, if tariffs were applied in a non-preferential
manner and were increased  from t to t', the costs to the economy  of the increase  in the tariff
would  be the shaded area ABCD. The customs  union imposes  the additional  costs equal to the
areas FEHG and HUE, representing  inefficiency  losses and transfers  to partner country suppliers,
respectively.
Combined  Loss of the Customs  Union and the Free Trade Agreement
The combined  loss of the Free Trade Agreement  and the customs  union is larger than the
loss of the customs  union or the Free Trade Agreement  alone and equals the triangle BCL plus the
rectangle  MFEJ.  A non-preferential  tariff of rate t' would  produce a welfare  loss equal to the
triangle  BCL. The difference  is equal to the area MFEJ which derives  from the fact that
consumers  in country A pay higher prices to partner country  producers  than they would have to
pay to rest of the world producers. The area MFEJ would  be captured  for country A as tariff
revenue and not lost to the economy  if the tariff were not preferential. Instead  with a the
24combination  Free Trade Agreement  and customs  union the area MFEJ is added to the losses of
country A, thereby greatly magnifying  the losses. The area MFEJ represents  a combination  of
transfers to partner country  suppliers (the area MNEJ) plus inefficiency  (deadweight)  losses of
using marginally  inefficient  partner country suppliers  (the triangle  NFE).  It is necessary  to
reduce this estimate of the losses by the increase  in the terms of trade earned by exporters  from
country A on their sales within the PTA. Since the tariff primarily  benefits existing Customs
Union members, these gains  may be expected  to be small.
Conclusion
A tariff will induce  inefficiency  losses, but preferential  trading areas with partners with
upsloping supply  curves greatly magnify  the losses. This explains why preferential  trade
arrangements  with small partner countries  or with countries  that may be expected  to increase
supply at higher protected  prices can be expected  to be very inefficient,  more inefficient an  non-
preferential  tariff protection  at the same rate.
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27TABLE  1.  Foreign  Trade  of the  New  Independent  States  with  Each  Other  1991-95
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Millions  of Current  US Dollars  at  Market  Exchange  Rates
Armenia  3,823  4,686  243  292  124  159  159  206  167  335
Azerbaijan  9,091  7,013  797  665  591  1,036  283  499  222  242
Belarus  23,151  20,375  1.939  2,128  3,092  3,348  2,085  2,990  3,292  3,868
Estonia  3,836  2,996  147  146  343  244  575  407  536  634
Georgia  5,594  4,806  144  224  295  433  156  280  75  110
Kazakstan  14,285  16,949  2,141  2,463  3,126  3,576  2,014  2,042  2,874  3.435
Kyrgyz Republic  5,163  4,293  236  344  282  378  325  402  272  357
Latvia  5,920  4,365  451  472  539  488  503  495  601  637
Lithuania  9,268  6,251  505  624  929  1,111  1,170  1,285  1,033  1,679
Moldova  6,190  5,525  313  470  303  452  413  483  485  583
Russia  108,571  83.333  10,954  9,246  15,752  10,546  15,407  10,978  16,586  14,493
Tajikistan  3,456  4,361  93  172  118  198  170  252  265  488
Turkmenistan  6,314  3,684  616  410  1,731  876  1,689  1,002  1,434  1,024
Ukraine  49,598  61,217  5,262  6,425  5,669  9,185  5,543  7,593  7,289  9,032
Uzbekistan  13,761  14,100  628  827  2,085  2,225  1,408  1,086  1,317  1,292
Former  Soviet Union  268,022  243,954  24,468  24,907  34,980  34,253  31,900  29,999  36,448  38,209
Volume  of Trade  (1991 =100)
Armenia  100.0  100.0  70.5  35.3  30.2  25.8  19.9  18.2  14.4  16.2
Azerbaijan  100.0  100.0  50.7  46.6  24.6  23.4  10.8  18.4  6.1  7.1
Belarus  100.0  100.0  77.8  76.1  59.2  61.8  42.0  45.3  64.8  57.2
Estonia  100.0  100.0  37.9  38.7  21.5  17.6  13.2  18.8  15.4  25.8
Georgia  100.0  100.0  24.3  37.5  22.7  33.0  11.1  13.8  5.2  5.3
Kazakstan  100.0  100.0  95.8  110.1  63.8  72.3  32.4  30.8  45.3  32.1
Kyrgyz Republic  100.0  100.0  45.8  56.1  22.8  31.5  18.5  21.5  15.1  18.6
Latvia  100.0  100.0  79.6  80.4  23.5  25.1  17.0  23.1  20.2  24.4
Lithuania  100.0  100.0  48.2  71.1  28.9  28.3  14.5  18.5  17.0  19.6
Moldova  100.0  100.0  52.1  61.3  45.9  46.9  28.5  27.0  32.1  29.6
Russia  100.0  100.0  72.2  86.2  46.7  54.2  32.5  44.9  33.8  58.2
Tajikistan  100.0  100.0  26.1  32.2  15.1  16.2  16.5  13.4  25.1  25.4
Turkmenistan  100.0  100.0  95.5  114.7  54.5  100.0  48.2  23.0  40.0  23.0
Ukraine  100.0  100.0  64.8  79.3  39.8  56.5  24.9  26.3  27.2  24.8
Uzbekistan  100.0  100.0  45.0  49.4  43.3  43.6  28.9  18.2  26.4  21.1
Former Soviet Union  100.0  100.0  67.4  77.4  43.7  52.1  29.0  32.7  31.5  36.7
SOURCES:  IMF  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics,  1995  Annual  for  the  following  countries  and  periods:  Armenia  1994-95;  Azerbaijan  1992-95;
Estonia  1993-95;  Latvia  1993-95;  Lithuania  1994-95;  Moldova  1992-95;  Russia  1994-95,  Ukraine  1994-95.  For  all  other  countries  and  periods,
national  official  statistics  and  World  Bank  staff  estimates  were  used.  For  further  information  on  sources  and  methods,  see  Michalopoulos,  C.  and
D.  Tarr,  Trade  in the  New  Independent  States,  1994.  Studies  of Economies  in Transformation  No.  13.  World  Bank,  Chapter  I  and  Appendix;
Belkindas,  M.  and  O.V.  Ivanova,  Foreign Trade  Statistics  in  the  USSR  and  Successor  States,  1996.  Studies  of Economies  in  Transformation
No.  18.  World  Bank,  Chapter  8.
28Table 2:  Tariff Rates of the Russian Federation
Sectors  Unweighted




Wearing  apparel  24.1
Leather  products  9.7
Footwear  20.0
Wood, cork, and  products  17.5
Wooden  furniture  & fixtures  24.7
Paper products  14.2
Printing  & publishing  12.5
Industrial  chemicals  5.7
Other chemical  products  7.4
Petroleum  refineries  5.0
Petroleum  & coal products  9.0
Rubber  products  6.0
Plastic products  nec.  13.8
Ceramic  products  22.9
Glass & glass products  14.5
Other nonmetal  min prods  15.8
Iron & steel B-met  ind  5.6
Nonferrous  B-met  ind  13.1
Metal  products  nec  18.8
Nonelectric  machinery  12.4
Electrical  machinery  10.1
Transport  equipment  16.6
Scientific  equipment  15.7
Other manufacturing  20.5
Source: World Bank  estimates  for 1996.
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